Abstract Masking schemes to secure AES implementations against side-channel attacks is a topic of ongoing research. The most sensitive part of the AES is the non-linear SubBytes operation, in particular, the inversion in G F(2 8 ), the Galois field of 2 8 elements. In hardware implementations, it is well known that the use of the tower of extensions
Introduction
Securing cryptographic primitives on embedded devices is still a challenge today. One of the major threats in constrained environment is side-channel attacks introduced by Kocher et al. in [16] . Such attacks can be performed easily by an attacker with little knowledge about implementation details. Differential side-channel attacks exploit relationships between the processed data by the device and the side-channel leakage measured by an attacker. If we consider power consumption as the side-channel leakage, a power model can be assumed by the attacker [4, 21] . Using this model, he can produce hypothetical values predicting the leakage information at several moments in time. These predictions are compared to the real power consumption of the device. The comparison is done using various statistical tests, for example the distance of means [16] , the Pearson correlation factor [4] or, more recently, mutual information [13] .
The advanced encryption standard (AES) is the standard for symmetric encryption [25] , replacing the older data encryption standard (DES) [24] . It is used in many embedded systems and therefore its side-channel resistance has been studied in details over the years. Researchers have proposed different types of countermeasures, some more practical than others. The most general method to counter side-channel attacks is to randomize the intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithm. As the side-channel leakage is dependent on the values processed by the smart cards, the data is then de-correlated from the side-channel observations. In the case of the AES algorithm, several countermeasures have been proposed based on masking intermediate values of the AES. Most of them are concentrated on the SubBytes transformation which is the only non-linear transformation involved in the AES.
The most efficient SubBytes hardware implementation uses composite field arithmetic. Consequently, techniques introduced in [30, 28, 38] compute the SubBytes operation of the AES in a subfield of G F(2 8 ). In these articles, the construction of the subfield is fixed arbitrarily whereas in [34] the authors propose to use a construction that minimizes the computation cost of composite field operations. In this work, we randomize the tower field construction (TFC) G F(2) ⊂ G F(2 4 ) ⊂ G F(2 8 ) and study its impact on the side-channel resistance of the AES. When computing the inverse map in G F(2 8 ), we have, in our case, to compute the norm in the field extension G F(2 8 )/G F(2 4 ). Hence, in order to thwart sidechannel attack, the distribution of the masked norm values for a given element of G F(2 8 ), by considering all representations in use, should spread uniformly over G F(2 4 ). We introduce efficient methods to reach this requirement and analyze their efficiency from both the implementation and the side-channel resistance sides.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give a brief description of the AES. Section 3 summarizes the major masking methods proposed for AES. Our proposition is based on a random TFC which is studied in Sect. 4. The effect of this randomness on norm values is analyzed in Sect. 5. A theoretical analysis of the security of our proposition against side-channel attacks leads to additional masking methods. In Sect. 6, we report the results of a differential power analysis attack on our propositions. We conclude this article in Sect. 7.
AES
We give a brief description of the AES round function, omitting the key schedule. More details can be found in [25] . The AES is defined for 128-bit blocks and key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits. The 128-bit plaintext is viewed as a 4 × 4 byte matrix, called state, bytes corresponding in some way to elements of G F(2 8 ).
